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Amidst the rise of a new Cold War between China and the US, Hong 
Kong has been called Ground Zero, the new Berlin, or the Global 
Frontier by various media outlets. During an ongoing US-China 
trade war, the Water Movement broke out in 2019. It was the largest 
and most prolonged social movement that Hong Kong has seen, 
and one that was met with the direst consequence – the imposition 
of a sweeping National Security Law that has changed the political 
landscape of Hong Kong. Soon after the social movement erupted, 
the song Glory to Hong Kong gained huge popularity and came to be 
known unofficially as the ‘national anthem’ of Hong Kong. It has been 
sung regularly at protests, with many language versions being circulated 
on YouTube. Taking a social semiotic approach, this paper interprets 
the meaning of this protest anthem, teasing out its multimodal layers 
and analysing its production, lyrics, musical form, digital renditions, 
and live performances in light of the evolving socio-political situation 
at the time. The analysis suggests that certain renditions of the song 
expressed not only political defiance but also a budding national 
imagination as a route of redressing injustice, as disappointment in 
rule of law grew; however, ideological cohesion among movement 
participants remained limited. Although the National Security Law 
has successfully quenched such political expressions, confidence in 
the rule of law has to be restored in order to provide a much-needed 
pressure valve for Hong Kong.
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Social Movement and Law Through the Lens of Music
Social movements as a political form began in Western Europe and 
North America in the late eighteenth century as a means of collective 
claim-making against target authorities. Tilly and Wood’s historical 
research (2009) shows that social movements broadly corresponded 
with democratization. For more than two centuries, social movements 
flourished during democratization, and receded when authoritarian 
regimes curtailed democratic rights. Democratization promotes social 
movements by establishing rights to assemble, associate, and to speak 
collectively. It also underpins the relationship between government 
and its people by affirming the principle of popular sovereignty; 
opportunities in participatory decision-making, such as the right to 
vote and to serve on jury, therefore also encourage social movement.
According to the resource mobilisation theory (Jenkins 1983), the 
success of social movements depends on resources (including material 
and symbolic resources) being available to them. Law may be considered 
a critical resource – legal protection of civil liberties can facilitate or 
restrain social movements. Rights discourse can also confer legitimacy 
to a movement and constitute an important symbolic resource (Chen 
2017).
Three core components define social movements: campaigns 
(referring to sustained public effort in claim-making), repertoires 
(referring to political actions), and WUNC (which stands for 
worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment) displays (Tilly and 
Wood 2009). Along with public meetings, street marches, press 
releases, and slogan-chanting, singing is a common repertoire of claim-
making performances. Songs and rituals enrich a movement’s culture, 
enhance the pleasure of participation, and help participants cope with 
their fears. They are examples of encouragement mechanisms that often 
help sustain a movement (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001).
Viewed more broadly, social movements can be conceptualized 
not only as political but also cultural activities, for they often redefine, 
reinterpret and ascribe new meaning to cultural traditions. Popular 
music infuses powerful ideas from movements of the time and becomes 
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a spiritual link between generations of activists (Eyerman and Jamison 
1998). Even after the movements fade in the political scene, “the music 
remains as a memory and as a potential way to inspire new waves of 
mobilization” (ibid: 2). 
This article examines the interrelation between social movement and 
law through interpreting the song Glory to Hong Kong, which was the 
protest anthem during what has become known as the Water Movement 
in Hong Kong. The Water Movement, which erupted in opposition to 
a bill that would allow criminal suspects to be extradited from Hong 
Kong to mainland China, was not unlike other social movements. 
Like many other recent protests around the world, the movement was 
decentralized and had a loose organisational structure; it was mobilised 
and heavily mediated through the use of social media and other modern 
communication technologies. It has all the three core components of 
a social movement that Tilly and Wood describe.
There are however good reasons why the Water Movement, and its 
lingering legal and political aftermath, deserves special attention in the 
global political landscape today. Not only was the Water Movement 
the largest and most prolonged social movement that Hong Kong 
has seen, it was met with the direst of consequences – the imposition 
of a sweeping National Security Law that significantly curtails civil 
liberties (Clift 2020). The timing of its eruption – in the middle of an 
ongoing US-China trade war – was also highly significant. Amidst 
the rise of a new Cold War between China and the US, Hong Kong 
has been called Ground Zero, the new Berlin, or the Global Frontier 
by various media outlets (Fong 2020; Lee 2020; Wasserstrom 2020). 
What might normally be considered internal politics to a city of 7.5 
million people has come to feature in major diplomatic rows. The United 
Kingdom has criticised China for breaching their treaty agreement 
by curtailing the autonomy, rights and freedoms in the former colony 
(Savage 2021). The Five Eyes intelligence alliance, consisting of United 
States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, has 
vowed to protect Hong Kong as a bastion of freedom (Rej 2020). The 
US has sanctioned Hong Kong and Chinese officials for undermining 
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Hong Kong’s autonomy and for suppressing political opposition in the 
legislature (Delaney 2020), and China has responded by imposing 
retaliatory sanctions (Sevastopulo and Riordan 2021).
It is productive to examine the relationship between social 
movement and law through the lens of a protest anthem, not only 
because the song encapsulates the shared emotions and collective 
identity among participants of the movement, but also because it 
resonates with people of a wide political spectrum and momentarily 
unifies them. Moreover, the song’s continued political sensitivity and 
the censorship it has drawn illuminate the rapid closure of space for 
social movements in Hong Kong today.
This paper will interpret the song by analysing how semiotic 
resources are deployed in its creation, renditions and performances, and 
how they may be interpreted in the socio-political context. Section 2 
details the history of social movements in post-handover Hong Kong 
and highlights salient features of the Water Movement, providing 
relevant socio-political background and setting the stage for the analysis 
that follows. Section 3 offers a multimodal, and socially and legally 
situated analysis of Glory to Hong Kong, covering the song’s creative 
process, lyrics, musical elements, digital mediation, and performances, 
analysing how different semiotic resources are deployed and combined 
to create meaning. The section ends with an examination of the 
legal aftermath of the movement through the lens of the song. The 
final section concludes the paper by contemplating challenges and 
opportunities, and using Hong Kong as an illustrative case of how law 
can enable and disable social movements. 
Chinese Nationalism and Political Resistance in Post-
Handover Hong Kong
Although political representation and legal equality were limited 
during most of the colonial period in British Hong Kong (1841-1997), 
social reforms in the early 1970s asserted the colonial government as a 
protector of local interests (from education, housing, to anti-corruption) 
(Ng and Wong 2017). Political reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have led 
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to partial democratization of the legislature and local administration, 
successfully absorbing many social activists into electoral politics (Chen 
2017). The prospect of reunification with China, a fate sealed by the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, and the Tiananmen massacre 
in 1989 led to a legal awakening, making many Hong Kong people 
realize that the rule of law and the protection of individual rights are 
important treasures that differentiate Hong Kong from mainland 
China. After the United Kingdom handed Hong Kong over to China 
on 1 July 1997, although the city – as a Special Administration Region 
under the One Country, Two Systems model – still enjoys many more 
rights and freedoms than their mainland counterparts, ideologies and 
practices in the two systems frequently clashed, as local interests were 
subsumed into and undermined by national interests, and the meaning 
of rule of law was gradually transposed into law and order. Peaceful 
protests occurred regularly and increasingly frequently (for example, 
6818 legal processions occurred in 2014 alone, compared with an 
average of 2200 public meetings a year between 1997 and 2007, see 
figures cited in Chen 2017) until 2020. Despite their frequency, these 
protests may be considered a testimony of political freedom enjoyed in 
Hong Kong and of the health of One Country, Two Systems. 
As will become evident below, most of the largest protests in post-
handover Hong Kong were triggered by public opposition to proposed 
changes in law. The first massive protest in post-handover Hong Kong 
broke out in 2003, when a proposed national security law (National 
Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill 2003), the introduction of which 
is meant to satisfy Article 23 of the Basic Law, drove half a million 
people onto the street on 1 July. The government shelved the bill in 
response, with the anticipation that it will be reintroduced when the 
timing is right.1 Ever since, a regular protest happened annually and 
ritualistically on the handover anniversary, focusing on social and 
political issues pertinent at the time (Lee and Chan 2011).
The localist turn in Hong Kong’s social movements happened 
around 2006 and 2007, when young activists protested to protect the 
Star Ferry Terminal and Queen’s Pier from demolition, in the name 
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of preserving local heritage and identity (Chen 2017). This localist 
movement gained further momentum when activists campaigned in 
2009 to oppose the government’s construction of a high-speed railway 
connecting Hong Kong with mainland China, which required the 
demolishment of local farmland. Longitudinal survey of ethnic identity 
shows that since late 2000s, a local Hong Kong identity surged against 
a diminishing sense of national identity (Steinhardt et al. 2018).
In 2012, a government plan to introduce national education into the 
school curriculum was ridden with controversy about the partiality of 
the teaching materials, drawing thousands of uniformed high schoolers 
(including the then 14-year old activist Joshua Wong) to rally outside 
government headquarters and chanting out loud their refusal to be 
brainwashed.2
Two years later, in 2014, a proposed electoral reform – which was 
to deliver China’s promise of ‘democracy’ to Hong Kong by allowing 
the central government to prescreen the candidates for Chief Executive 
before letting people vote on two or three of them – led to a 79-day 
Occupy movement that demanded genuine universal suffrage.3 The 
protest is also known as the Umbrella Movement – referring to the 
use of umbrellas as protection against the police’s use of tear gas and 
batons, symbolising the unequal physical power between protestors and 
law enforcers and the peacefulness of the protestors. Two years later, 
the first ‘riot’ Hong Kong had seen in decades happened when localist 
groups rallied to shield street hawkers from government crackdown 
in Mong Kok (an incident sometimes called the Fishball Revolution), 
clashing physically with the police.
A dramatic incident in 2015-2016 provides an important context to 
understanding the 2019 movement which is the focus of discussion in 
this paper. Thanks to the freedom of speech enshrined in Article 16 of 
the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Hong Kong (and Macau to a 
lesser extent) is the only place in China where one can legally protest on 
the street and print dissident literature. Five booksellers, all connected 
with one dissident bookstore in Hong Kong, disappeared one by one 
within the territory of Hong Kong and Thailand, with there being no 
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immigration record of them exiting the territory, and reappeared in 
mainland China confessing to various crimes on national television 
(Leung 2017). This incident struck a nerve in Hong Kong, provoking 
fear that the freedoms guaranteed by One Country, Two Systems may 
be quickly eroding (The Wall Street Journal January 6 2016).
Fast-forward to 2019. Chan Tong-kai murdered his pregnant 
girlfriend Poon Hui-wing, when the two Hong Kong residents 
vacationed in Taiwan. Chan returned to Hong Kong, evading murder 
charges because he committed the crime outside of Hong Kong’s 
jurisdiction. Hong Kong has entered into extradition treaties with 
20 countries, but it has none with Taiwan or with mainland China 
(Chen 2019).4 Although the case in hand only concerned Taiwan, the 
authorities in Hong Kong moved to pass a bill that would allow for the 
extradition of criminals not only to Taiwan but also to the mainland 
China.5 In response, the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council warned that 
it could issue a travel warning for Hong Kong if this law was passed, 
as it would allow Taiwanese residents to be extradited from Hong 
Kong to the mainland; the Taiwan government also announced that 
it would not accept the extradition of Chan under this law (Purbrick 
2019). Meanwhile, the legal community in Hong Kong was concerned 
that insufficient human rights safeguards were built into the proposed 
bill: for instance, the requesting jurisdiction would not be required to 
comply with conditions such as guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, and 
the bill gave Hong Kong courts no power to assess whether extradition 
complied with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(or similar rights instruments) (Chan 2019). Moreover, it is unlikely 
that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong would effectively play the 
role of a gatekeeper as s/he is accountable to the Central Government 
(Chen 2019).
The prevailing fear was that Hong Kong people who broke no law 
in Hong Kong, if suspected of breaking laws in China, could then be 
legally transferred to the mainland for interrogation and prosecution. 
Since currently most laws in China do not apply to Hong Kong, the 
extradition bill could introduce a legal muddle that chills freedoms 
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enjoyed in Hong Kong. The horror experienced by the booksellers 
would no longer be an isolated incident.
The massive and prolonged movement against the extradition bill 
has engendered some of the most violent clashes in the history of protest 
in Hong Kong. The movement started in early 2019, gained momentum 
in June 2019, and persisted through the rest of the year. It only dwindled 
following the coronavirus outbreak in early 2020, and was stamped out 
by the National Security Law when it was passed on 30 June 2020. 
These months of unrest saw a record-breaking march attended by 
two million people (more than a quarter of the population), multiple 
general strikes, countless physical clashes between the protesters and 
the riot police, schools suspended, public transport halted, university 
campuses under siege, and more than 10,000 arrests. Critically, the 
protest persisted, and in fact continued to escalate, even after the Chief 
Executive formally withdrew the proposed bill in September 2019. 
Apart from demanding universal suffrage, which is the ultimate goal, 
protesters also sought to exonerate thousands of arrestees, to remove the 
characterisation of the unrest as a riot, and to establish an independent 
commission of inquiry into police conduct and use of force. In other 
words, four out of the five demands had to do with the government’s 
heavy-handed approach to the movement itself.
There are many reasons why the 2019 protest will be remembered as 
a watershed, the most notable of which being its legal aftermath. Why 
was the Water Movement so unnerving to Beijing that it rushed to pass 
the National Security Law? A few salient features of the Movement 
will be highlighted here.
The most signif icant aspect of the Water Movement is the 
radicalization of claims and tactics. The term radicalization here 
refers to the adoption of ideologies and strategies that depart from 
existing norms, and are not necessarily morally questionable (see Beach 
1977, also Lee and Chan 2011). Radicalization of the mainstream 
requires discursive work – a new framing that redefines a situation 
and articulates the necessity of escalation, in order to promote the 
legitimacy, feasibility and effectiveness of new protest directions (Lee 
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and Chan 2018).
As reviewed above, major protests in post-handover Hong Kong 
were triggered by the denial or restriction of freedom, often through the 
violence of law. Regardless of the original trigger, the protest discourse 
kept returning to the failed promise of democracy (Fu 2020). Gradually, 
protestors started making claims against the Central government 
rather than the Hong Kong government (Garret 2015), which reflects 
the perceived erosion of the One Country, Two Systems governing 
model. In earlier protests, the anger that protestors felt was mostly 
directed towards top officials in Hong Kong (most noticeably past 
Chief Executives Tung Chee-Hwa, Donald Tsang, and Leung Chun-
Ying; past Chief Security of Secretary Regina Ip who was responsible 
for Article 23). By 2019, even though there was no shortage of anger 
expressed at the current Chief Executive Carrie Lam, the protest was 
filled with visible symbols of resistance against the Communist Party. 
For more than a decade, Hong Kong citizens had fully recognized 
the Chinese government instead of the Hong Kong government as 
the ultimate obstacle to democratization (Lee and Chan 2011). The 
resistance against fuller integration with mainland China had driven 
the radicalization of claims. While the majority of protestors strived 
for democracy, there were factions of protestors who started making 
claims about Hong Kong independence. This arose from the continued 
growth of a Hong Kong identity and a localist interest, which took 
root during earlier waves of protest.6 As Fu (2020) observes, political 
dissidents and successionists are not natural allies because they often 
have conflicting goals. Older activists in Hong Kong are mostly Chinese 
patriots who hope to bring democracy to both China and Hong Kong; 
they supported the democracy movement in China in 1989 and pray 
for a democratic China every year at the June 4 vigil in Hong Kong. 
Their aspiration does not resonate with many young people, who are 
more locally oriented.
The radicalization of claims had been accompanied by the 
radicalization of tactics. Ho (2000) classif ies resistance tactics 
into four types: orderly politics (i.e., what happens within political 
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institutions), polite politics (i.e., claims-making that happens outside 
the political structure but does not disrupt social routines and political 
structures), protests (such as strikes and illegal occupation, which are 
disruptive), and violence (i.e., actions that cause physical damage). 
With a few notable exceptions, social movements in Hong Kong have 
predominantly taken the form of polite politics, with tens of thousands 
of people frequently taking to the street but leaving no damage to 
property after they disperse (Dearden 2014a & 2014b). The idea of 
Occupying Central, as proposed in 2013 by two academics and a 
reverend, represented a radicalization of the moderates (Lee and Chan 
2018). Occupying streets marks a milestone because it is disruptive, 
involving breaking the law in the form of civil disobedience. Despite 
its disruption, the Umbrella Movement was known for its civility, 
with protestors cleaning up the streets, recycling waste, producing 
art, and educating the public at the Occupy sites. Young participants 
felt empowered by the movement, although they also regretted not 
having further escalated their tactic, believing that remaining peaceful 
was why the movement failed (Ho and Hung 2020). The 2019 protest 
presented an opportunity for redemption. It started in the realm of 
polite politics – with big crowds marching from one point to another, 
but soon even peaceful protests were met with unprecedented police 
brutality (Amnesty International September 19 2019) involving the use 
of live ammunition, tear gas, water cannons containing undisclosed 
chemical irritants, plastic bullets, pepper balls, sponge grenades, and 
bean bags. Protestors also stepped up, donning gas masks, helmets, 
and protective eyewear, after a high school teacher was shot in the eye 
with a police projectile. A notable discursive shift, accompanied with a 
new level of anger, happened after a group of thugs attacked protestors 
and other civilians at a subway station in Yuen Long on 21 July 2019, 
seemingly with the cooperation of the police force. The footage and 
images that then circulated in digital media platforms shocked the 
moderates. The lack of an effective mechanism to keep police power 
in check led to more widespread acceptance and gradual normalization 
of the use of force during the movement. More radical protest tactics 
had been deployed, which included storming into the Legislative 
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Council Complex, damaging traffic lights and public transit facilities, 
throwing Molotov cocktails, and damaging shops that are associated 
with mainland China (Ho and Hung 2020). 
Apart from the radicalization of claims and tactics, the Water 
Movement was also difficult to crush because of its fluidity in form 
and organisation. The name of the movement is inspired by Bruce 
Lee’s famous quote: ‘Be formless, shapeless — like water. Water can 
flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend.’  (Zhou and Wong 2019) It 
was coordinated through discussion on digital platforms such as the 
reddit-like forum LIHKG and encrypted communication tools such as 
Telegram. Although a leaderless movement can be challenging because 
of vulnerability to factioning and infiltration, anonymity provides some 
protection. Anonymity was a particularly important protest tactic in 
the Water Movement because many recognisable faces of the Umbrella 
Movement had been jailed for archaic crimes such as conspiracy or 
incitement to commit public nuisance, and incitement to incite public 
nuisance (The Guardian April 9 2019). A leaderless movement does not 
easily lose its momentum after some protesters are arrested. Distributed 
leadership is not unique to the Water Movement – it is but one example 
of a global rise in networked social movements in the digital era 
(Western 2014, see also Castells 2015). The Water Movement was fluid 
in form as well as organisation. Instead of marching on a determined 
route or Occupying a fixed area, protesters showed up, protested, and 
dispersed. Since protesters had limited ability to physically clash with 
the police force, making their protest activity unpredictable was also 
one way of protecting themselves. This strategy, which is the anti-thesis 
of Occupy, has since cross-fertilized transnationally in recent protests 
in Belarus and Thailand in 2020. One downside of decentralization, 
however, is that a leaderless movement cannot effectively negotiate 
with the government when the opportunity comes, making escalation 
difficult to avoid. 
Finally, the Water Movement was particularly active in external 
mobilisation, leveraging the city’s status as an international financial 
hub and as a former colony. Using crowdsourced creativity and 
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technological savviness, many of the protest events were a spectacle 
well suited for media dissemination (what Delicath and Deluca 2003 
called image events): from colourful Lennon Walls that ‘blossomed’ 
everywhere, to a 3D-printed four-metre statue of Lady Liberty erected 
on top of the Lion Rock mountain in Kowloon, or the formation of a 
human chain with more than 200,000 people in imitation of the Baltic 
Way.7 Since most local media companies are seen to have lost their 
journalist neutrality after being acquired by mainland Chinese owners 
(see Lee and Chan 2018), activists turned their attention to digital and 
global media. Protesters crowdfunded over HKD5 million dollars – 
within hours – to place advertisements in international newspapers 
ahead of the G20 summit to put pressure on global leaders to speak up 
for Hong Kong. A delegation of protesting students visited different 
countries and urged politicians to pledge their support, speaking 
at the UK parliament and lobbying the US to pass the Hong Kong 
Human Rights and Democracy Act (Hong Kong Watch September 9 
2019, ABC News September 3 2019). The global resonance that the 
movement created benefited immensely from its timing – when a new 
Cold War rhetoric was being constructed, portraying a totalitarian 
China absorbing and corrupting a free and democratic West. The 
global outlook of the movement and its attempt at citizen diplomacy 
were unmistakable, suggesting that the protesters might have given 
up on all hopes that their government would listen to its people short 
of external pressure. This kind of external pressure, amidst US-China 
tensions and international attention on China’s mass detention of 
Uyghurs, had challenged Beijing’s patience with Hong Kong.
The Political Soundtracks of Hong Kong 
Music has always been a means of political expression, both by the 
powerful and the powerless. It can be used to foster collective identity 
(Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001), based not only on shared 
ideology but also emotional experiences. Such ideology and emotional 
experiences however cannot be directly mapped onto formal features 
of music. Decades of research suggests that emotional responses to 
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music rarely come from decontextualized, structural aesthetic features 
but complex interactions between the music, the listener, and the 
situation (Sloboda and Juslin 2010). Taking a social semiotic approach, 
this section analyses the song Glory to Hong Kong against the wider 
political soundscape. 
A Chinese National Anthem in Hong Kong
Concerned that Hong Kong has become a hub of dissent, China 
has made it a mission to instil a sense of nationalism in Hong Kong, 
albeit with limited success.8 Apart from an unsuccessful introduction 
of a national education curriculum in 2012, there have been ongoing 
attempts in naturalising national symbols in everyday life, through 
promoting flag-raising ceremonies and the use of Mandarin in public 
schools, or broadcasting an acoustic version of the national anthem on 
television just before the daily news.9 
In light of the gradual loss of freedom that Hong Kong people 
have experienced, Chinese national symbols are viewed by some as a 
reminder of political oppression and a centralized effort to drown Hong 
Kong identity. After the Umbrella Movement in 2014, the Chinese 
national anthem was frequently booed when played during football 
matches in Hong Kong (Carrico 2019, Yu 2018).10 On 1 October 
2017, the NPC passed a National Anthem Law that punishes people 
who altered or insulted ‘The March of the Volunteers’ on the mainland. 
Soon after its passage in Mainland China, the NPC inserted it into 
the Annex III of the Basic Law on 4 November 2017, requiring the 
HKSAR to apply it ‘locally by way of promulgation or legislation’ under 
Article 18. The national anthem bill was tabled in early 2019 but its 
passage was delayed during the Water Movement. It was eventually 
passed in June 2020.
B Glory to Hong Kong as a Protest Anthem
Music has consistently been a language of social movement in Hong 
Kong. Held annually in the Victoria Park in Hong Kong, a candle-lit 
vigil commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre has its 
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own soundtrack that carries the grief of thousands of attendees.11 In 
post-handover Hong Kong, the most popular protest song is Under 
the Vast Sky. Released by the popular rock band Beyond in 1993, 
when Cantopop was still at the peak of its glory, the ballad is part of 
a collective memory in Hong Kong and has retained its popularity 
for more than a quarter of a century. With its lyrics alluding to the 
yearning for one’s dream and freedom, it is a song of hope that has 
been adopted for different events, campaigns, and protests.12 In this 
respect it is typical. The language of popular music is often semantically 
underspecified and affords a wide range of meanings that appeal to a 
divergent audience.
The theme song for the 2012 protest against the national education 
curriculum was Pink Floyd’s Another Brick in the Wall. Its signature lines 
– ‘We don’t need no education. We don’t need no thought control ’ – appeared 
as protest signs and slogans that articulated the young protesters’ refusal 
to be ‘brainwashed’. The original English song was used in the protest, 
without localisation. 
Multiple songs were heard during the prolonged Occupy movement 
in 2014, including Under the Vast Sky. The most prominent song for 
the protest was Do You Hear the People Sing from the Broadway musical 
Les Misérables, as well as its Cantonese version localised specifically 
during the protest.13 The Cantonese lyrics urges people to listen to 
their conscience, speak up, and protect the city. Various versions were 
released on YouTube and widely circulated on social media.14 After the 
police fired teargas on the protesters, activist Lo Hiu-pan composed an 
original song Raise the Umbrella to boost the morale of the protesters 
(South China Morning Post December 29 2014). It was performed by pop 
artists Denise Ho, Anthony Wong, and Deanie Ip. With a slow-paced 
and calming tune, and lyrics that focused on solidarity and hope, the 
song paints a peaceful image of the Occupy movement.15
There was an initial resistance in the Water Movement against 
singing, since earlier protests were viewed by young people as futile; a 
commentator described them as ‘karaoke-style’: ‘go to the street, shout 
a few slogans, raise a few banners, feeling good after venting the anger; 
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no one cares if any outcome is achieved in the end’ (Kursk, cited in 
Lee and Chan 2018: 57). That resistance appeared to have given in 
with the release of Glory to Hong Kong. For an original composition (as 
contrasted with a cover song with a familiar tune) that could not get 
much airtime on mass media, the speed at which Glory to Hong Kong 
gained popularity was remarkable. Released on 31 August 2019, it took 
only two days before protestors belted it out during a football match, 
and for hundreds of people to sing it in a shopping mall another day 
later (Ho 2020). Not only has it attracted millions of viewers/listeners 
on YouTube, iTunes and Spotify, it topped YouTube HK’s 2019 local 
music video list. It had been memorised quickly and was performed 
during public rallies. Unlike popular music that people acquaint with 
through exposure in mass media and public spaces, this is a song that 
people need to be proactive in listening to in digital media. 
i The Making Of
Composer Thomas told Time Magazine that he sees music as a tool 
for unity and that he wrote the song to unite the people in Hong 
Kong and to boost their morale (Time Magazine 10 September 2019). 
What is interesting about the making of the song is how creativity 
and talent was crowdsourced by soliciting feedback and editing on 
draft lyrics posted on LIHKG. Thomas also recruited help for mixing 
and arrangement, as well as some 20 performers from the same forum 
to make a studio recording of the song (South China Morning Post 6 
December 2019). Unlike music that is professionally produced and 
presented to the public, this song was created in a decentralised manner, 
very much like the protest itself. Different groups then went on to 
create their own version of the song and shared them on YouTube.
Many semiotic choices are made in music making. The fact that the 
original recording of the song was performed by a group instead of by 
an individual suggests that the song attempts to bring people together. 
Voices of men and women in unison articulates a motivational frame 
(Benford and Snow 2000) for collective action in the social movement.
Another choice has to do with instrumentation. The official 
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recording of the song carries a march-like feeling as it was orchestrated 
with snare drum and trumpets, which sound like footsteps. Brass and 
drums are traditionally associated with military and marching bands. 
Military music is used to mobilise support, unite soldiers, and threaten 
the enemy during a battle; in modern times, its function is primarily 
ceremonial.
ii Lyrics 
The lyrics of the song used vocabulary that is common in Christian 
writing. This is more noticeable in the Cantonese than in the English 
version, as evident in the terms such as ‘榮光’ (‘glory’) in the Cantonese 
lyrics, which one hardly encounters in everyday Cantonese but 
frequently appears in Cantonese hymns which are translated from 
English. The lexical choice is likely to reflect the educational experience 
of many Hong Kongers who attended schools run by various Christian 
denominations, thanks to the colonial history of Hong Kong.16
The lyrics of the song and my translation are provided below.17 
何以 這土地 淚再流 Why does this land shed tears again?
何以 令眾人 亦憤恨 Why are the people enraged?
昂首 拒默沉 吶喊聲 響透 Keep our heads up, our voices strong 
盼自由 歸於 這裡 May freedom root here
何以 這恐懼 抹不走 Why can’t this fear be wiped away?
何以 為信念 從沒退後 Why do the faithful never retreat?
何解 血在流 但邁進聲 響透 Why do we bleed, but still march 
forward? 
建自由 光輝 香港 To build a free and glorious Hong 
Kong
在晚星 墜落 徬徨午夜 Stars may fall, and the night may be 
long and dark
迷霧裡 最遠處吹來 號角聲 Through the mist, a distant bugle 
blasts
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捍自由 來齊集這裡 來全力抗對 Stand with us, join together and resist 
勇氣 智慧 也永不滅 Our bravery and wisdom will forever 
live 
黎明來到 要光復 這香港 We will reclaim Hong Kong at the 
break of dawn
同行兒女 為正義 時代革命 Sons and daughters, for justice, wage 
the revolution of our time
祈求 民主與自由 萬世都不朽 Democracy and freedom shall always 
shine
我願榮光歸香港 May glory be to Hong Kong
Like battle hymns, the lyrics of Glory to Hong Kong talk about fear 
and hope, pain and sacrifice, bravery and commitment. They suggest 
the need to fight, moving beyond a long history of peaceful protests in 
Hong Kong. References to blood and the bugle no doubt conjure up 
the imagery of a battlefield, focusing on the here and now and calling 
upon people to fight for a collective ideal – in this case, ‘ justice’ (stanza 
4).  Gamson notes that injustice creates “the righteous anger that puts 
fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson 1992: 32). It transcends 
intellectual judgment, and this, moreover, is one of the reasons why 
framing struggles in terms of justice/injustice can be key to the political 
consciousness of collective action. In this case, the lyrics of Glory to 
Hong Kong seem to suggest that the path to justice requires bloodshed 
and overcoming fear, implying that legal mobilisation or polite politics 
is no longer a viable route. Read literally, they provide the discursive 
frame for the radicalisation of tactics. However, references to a distant 
bugle and the need to march forward as though one is at the front line 
of a warzone are clearly metaphorical. The lyrics could resonate with 
moderates who are not necessarily prepared for bloodshed.
Elsewhere, the song’s lyrics appeal to universal values such as 
‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, which readily borrow semiotic power from 
the growing anti-authoritarian sentiment of the new Cold War. The 
intended outcome is ‘glory’, which does not translate to any specific 
political goal. There is plenty of semantic ambiguity in words such as 
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‘reclaim’ and ‘revolution’, which are intertextual references to the 2016 
campaign slogan ‘Reclaim Hong Kong, the Revolution of Our Time’ by 
a young localist leader Edward Leung when he ran for the Legislative 
Council by-election. While the co-author of the slogan said they used 
the term ‘reclaim’ in protest against parallel traders whose activities 
disrupted people’s daily lives, they subsequently created the slogan, 
using ‘reclaim’ to mean ‘restoring the lost glamour of Hong Kong’, and 
‘revolution’ to mean letting young people lead social changes (Wong 
2020). But of course, ‘reclaim’ and ‘revolution’ can be interpreted very 
differently. Pro-Beijing lawyer and politician Maria Tam argues that 
‘reclaim’ or ‘liberate’ in Chinese implies separatism, which contravenes 
the Basic Law (Wong 2020).
In the fourth stanza, the song also uses the parent-child metaphor 
typical of nationalist discourse (cf. concepts such as motherland), 
which suggests a natural and intimate bond (like biological parentage) 
between a person and his/her place of birth (Johnson 1987). Although 
the lyrics do not make explicit what the people are resisting against, 
the land they are seeking to protect is local and has clearly defined 
geographical borders. 
All in all, the lyrics express a strong collective identity for Hong 
Kong and use justice as a master frame to motivate the audience. Since 
internal fragmentation contributed to the failure of the Umbrella 
Movement, activists in 2019 agreed to remain united no matter 
what, often calling for moderates and radicals to work together. The 
semantic ambiguity of Glory to Hong Kong’s lyrics deliberately masks the 
contestations that exist among the movement participants (more on this 
in the section below). In his discussion of the emotional power of music, 
Rühlig (2016) notes that songs can help people express their feelings 
even when the lyrics are not specific to their situation. Importantly, 
through its structural elements such as tempo, mode, volume, melody 
and rhythm, music does not only help express but can evoke emotions 
before the lyrics are rationally processed (Sloboda and Juslin 2010). In 
other words, people can feel emotionally connected to the song even 
if they do not ideologically align with all its words. 
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iii Digitally Mediated Renditions
The original music video for Glory to Hong Kong was posted directly on 
YouTube and used footage of the movement as its visual background. 
With mainstream media now largely under pro-establishment control, 
the Internet has become the major platform for social activists in Hong 
Kong to disseminate information. These audiovisual renditions of the 
song therefore convey not only emotions and thoughts, but they can 
also have a truth-bearing function (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). The 
video could multimodally authenticate protestors, their actions, and 
perspectives as the truth of their situation (Way 2017). 
Viewer response to the original video is worthy of attention here, 
for it may shed light on why it went viral and offer a glimpse of what 
people thought about it, even though comments posted on YouTube 
cannot be taken as representative of wider listener response. The 
comment with the highest number of upvotes (20k) reads: ‘so this is 
what it feels like, getting teary from hearing the national anthem’. 
Some other commentators expressed a sense of pride, warmth and 
belonging they felt when they listened to the song. At the same time, 
other commentators are wary of the label of ‘national anthem’, and urge 
others to stick to the five demands and stay away from any suspicion 
of separatist claims. The diversity in viewer response – from those 
who have a budding nationalist imagination and those who are wary 
of it – shows that the song has attracted sympathetic responses from 
a wide political spectrum. It also shows that the coherence and unity 
articulated in the lyrics do not reflect the unresolved internal tensions 
within the movement – the kind of conflicts between political dissidents 
and successionists Fu (2020) alluded to. The lyrics steered clear of darker 
subcurrents in the movement, such as its xenophobic and intolerant 
factions (Palmer 2020). This is not dissimilar to the anthem of the 
2009 Iranian protest, which also relied on its poetic abstractedness and 
universalism to appeal to its diverse supporters (Leone 2012).
Many digitally mediated variations of the Cantonese song have 
also been produced. One version of the song was performed by a full 
orchestra dressed in protest gear (gas masks, goggles, and helmets),18 
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Towards the end of the video, smoke could be seen in the background 
as the musicians performed, reminiscent of tear gas smoke that 
protesters regularly faced. This visual rendition provides the political 
context to interpret the song, suggesting that performers of this song 
represent protestors, who are suffering injustice. The dramatic costume 
and visualisation contribute to a multimodal expression of trauma as 
a common experience that bonds people together. The visualization 
shows that their immediate grievance relates to the police response 
to protests, which was, of course, backed by the government. Other 
mediated versions of the song, such as its Cantonese opera and sign 
language adaptations, seem to be used to appeal to different sectors of 
the community and garner local support.19 
Unlike earlier protest songs that were imported from overseas and 
domesticated with Cantonese lyrics, Glory to Hong Kong started in 
Cantonese and was subsequently rendered in many foreign languages, 
sometimes through diasporic Hong Kong communities.20 The effort 
to internationalise the song on digital media is both a means for local 
protesters to reach out for external support and for people abroad to 
express their solidarity to Hong Kong. Multilingual renditions of the 
song offer a sense of authenticity in the global support garnered. The 
need for reaching out conveys a lack of faith in resolving grievances 
through the local political and legal system. 
It is also worth mentioning that pro-establishment parties have tried 
to produce secondary creations of the song by changing the lyrics to 
praise the police and condemn the movement. One of these renditions 
was legislator Julius Ho’s Peace Upon Hong Kong, which has since been 
taken down by YouTube for copyright violation (Chiu 2019).
vi Performances and Signification
Perhaps even more interesting than how the song was produced was 
how it was used during the movement. Much has been written about 
the visuality of the Umbrella Movement (Garrett 2015; Lou and 
Jaworski 2016): sculptures, posters, stickers, photographs, post-it notes, 
etc. The prolonged occupation of a physical site allows for a highly 
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saturated visual landscape. Although the Water Movement was also 
filled with visual spectacles, the movement’s fluidity encouraged more 
transient forms of expression. Protesting with one’s voice is one such 
form. For instance, for several months protestors screamed protest 
slogans from their apartment windows at 10pm every night as a way of 
boosting morale (Creery 2019a).
As the government competed for the moral high ground, it painted 
a picture of protestors as rioters (sometimes even as terrorists) who were 
violent and destructive. Because singing is a peaceful activity that is 
not normally considered a disruption to public order, protesters started 
gathering in different public spaces to sing Glory to Hong Kong during 
the movement. When sung collectively, the audience may develop an 
affective response not only to the song but to the emotions expressed by 
other people participating in the event. On several occasions, protests 
became a singing contest when pro-government protesters showed up 
to wave Chinese flags and sing March of the Volunteers (Sum and Huang 
2019). These were battles in music between Cantonese and Mandarin, 
the ‘Hong Kong national anthem’ and the Chinese national anthem, 
and sub-state nationalists and nationalists. Apart from public spaces 
such as shopping malls, Glory to Hong Kong was also sung by protesters 
during football matches and school morning assemblies as a sign of 
defiance when national anthem was played (RTHK September 10 
2019), therefore directly competing with the national anthem. One 
interpretation of the popularity of the protest anthem is that it provided 
a semiotic resource that people had been looking for to counter the 
imminent imposition of a national anthem with which they struggled to 
identify. In this respect, it is striking that, in contrast to earlier protest 
music in Hong Kong, some protesters started putting their right hand 
to their left chest (i.e., where the heart is) when they sang Glory to Hong 
Kong – a gesture typically made when one sings a national anthem.21 
This semiotic reclaim of sovereignty cannot be missed, viewed in the 




Despite the rhetoric sometimes used in the movement and the 
budding nationalist imagination conveyed in some renditions of the 
song, the actions taken in the movement were much more typical of 
a prodemocracy social movement than a revolution. Militia activities 
were limited. Words used in the political context, such as during 
protests, cannot be taken too literally, as many of them are hyperbolic 
and metaphorical expressions. For example, anthems that portray an 
armed struggle may be used as political songs to stir up feelings of 
patriotism, but in context they are rarely literally a call to arms. Just like 
protest slogans that are empty signifiers with no fixed meanings (Lee 
et al. 2019), political expressions such as the song Glory to Hong Kong 
cannot be reduced to a singular, literal meaning.
Not taking a chance, however, Beijing decided to nip the rise of a 
Hong Kong nationalism in the bud by imposing the National Security 
Law, the passing of which had bypassed the Hong Kong legislature 
(Toru 2020; see also Fu 2020 for background about China’s imperatives 
in imposing national security legislation in Hong Kong). While any 
move towards political independence would clearly be unacceptable to 
Beijing, the National Security Law has such sweeping powers that the 
voicing of any political opposition about any public matter now bears a 
risk in Hong Kong. A snitching hotline has been set up for people to 
report on one another for potential endangerment to national security, 
recording 100,000 tips during the first six months of its operation (Lo 
2021). The annual 4th June vigil and the 1st July protest are no longer 
permitted. To date, over a hundred protestors, including activists 
Tony Chung and Agnes Chow, have been arrested for offending the 
National Security Law, which carries a maximum punishment of life 
imprisonment. The only remaining opposition newspaper in Hong 
Kong shut down in June 2021 after its top editors were arrested under 
National Security Law charges (Mahtani, McLaughlin and Yu 2021). 
At the same time, orderly politics no longer seems to be a viable form of 
resistance in Hong Kong: prodemocratic election candidates and elected 
legislators have been disqualified or prosecuted; some have fled Hong 
213
The Life and Death of a Protest Anthem at the 
Frontier of a New Cold War
Kong and are now on exile. After all the remaining prodemocratic 
legislators resigned in solidarity, there is not a single oppositional 
politician left in the legislature. The process of de-democratization is 
near complete.
The National Anthem Ordinance in Hong Kong has also been 
passed in Hong Kong. Effective from 12 June 2020, a person commits 
an offence if s/he publicly and intentionally insults the anthem in any 
way. Primary and secondary schools are required to teach the anthem 
to students. The government has now pronounced that chanting the 
protest slogan ‘Reclaim Hong Kong, the Revolution of Our Time’’ 
would be illegal under the National Security Law. Meanwhile, the 
government has refused to comment on whether singing the song Glory 
to Hong Kong would be illegal. In July 2020, the Education Bureau has 
banned students from singing, playing, or broadcasting the protest 
anthem on campus because it contains political messages (The Guardian 
July 8 2020). Whether singing it outside school premises would break 
the law remains unresolved.
After the enactment of the National Security Law, there were 
isolated incidents of people gathering in public spaces and singing the 
protest anthem. In one incident, which happened in a shopping mall in 
Mong Kok in August, the police issued the crowd a fine for violating 
the Covid gathering ban (Cheng 2020). Chinese-Filipino busker Oliver 
Ma sang the song on the street twice; twice he was arrested, on charges 
apparently unrelated to the National Security Law: for obstructing 
police officers and possession of offensive weapon (for a pair of toy 
handcuffs that he wears during performance as a social commentary) 
(Freemuse 2021; Ho 2021). There was also an incident of the public 
address speaker system at an MTR station being hacked twice to play 
the song in lieu of station announcements. In the meantime, the song 
and its various multimedia renditions are still accessible on the Internet.
The murky legal status of the protest anthem reflects a climate 
of fear and self-censorship now prevalent in Hong Kong. Although 
so far nobody has been charged with the National Security Law for 
performing the song, it is conceivable that such behaviour may be 
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considered an incitement to secessionism (Article 20-21). Similarly, 
it is unclear how much latitude one has in expressing of political 
disagreement before it could be deemed subversive (Article 22), 
and when communication with foreign nationals may be considered 
collusion (Articles 29-30). Case law is not yet available to show where 
boundaries may be drawn. Some cases may be tried in mainland China 
(Article 55) and trials may be held behind closed doors (Article 41). 
Beijing, instead of Hong Kong courts, will have the power to decide 
what the law means (Article 65).
Conclusion: Quietly, into that Cold Night
Certain renditions of Glory to Hong Kong may well reflect a budding 
national imagination in Hong Kong, even though separatism is not 
on the agenda for most protesters. For one thing, the five demands 
made by the protesters can be read within the framework of One 
Country, Two Systems. Moreover, China is, after all, a multinational 
state (preamble of the Chinese constitution; see also Zhu & Blachford 
2006). Not all nationalist sentiments crystallise into a movement of 
political independence that threatens national sovereignty. Poole 
(2005) notes that the language of nationalism may be used to express 
a profound discontent, such as the experience of social or economic 
marginalisation. Although sub-state nationalism is understandably 
seen by the state as a national security threat, suppressing the expression 
of discontent without tackling its source only aggravates it.
Social movements do not only transform politics but also culture 
and identity. The power of musical expressions in social movements is 
that even when the movement dwindles, their music can live on as a 
cultural artefact. Even if people are not allowed to sing it out loud as a 
protest anthem, a song can live on in people’s memories. In that sense, 
unlike what the title of this paper suggests, music does not die. In fact, 
the experience of banning music in post-revolutionary Iran showed a 
boomerang effect: the more music is pushed underground, the more 
subversive, desirable, and explosive it may become (Leone 2012).
The National Security Law has quenched the public imagination 
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of nationhood in Hong Kong, but it has not quenched the longing for 
justice. The violence that protestors experienced came from various 
repressive state apparatus, including policing and law, which the 
government has monopoly over. When doors to justice appeared to 
be closed in their current reality, protesters were looking for ways to 
restore the freedom they once enjoyed (thus ‘reclaiming’ Hong Kong) 
and to recreate a society with a government that is accountable to its 
people. Now that the National Security Law has kept secessionism at 
bay, the best way of restoring confidence in government is to put a stop 
to the perceived erosion of the rule of law, which can act as a pressure 
valve for grievances and has been a foundation of Hong Kong’s success.
Another challenge to the future of social movements in Hong 
Kong is internal and ideological. The vagueness of expressions that 
unite the protestors suggests a lack of ideological cohesion amongst 
them. The strengths and shortcomings of a leaderless social movement 
are one and the same: people of different ideological positions may be 
brought together as a united front. The same unity that gives power 
to the movement can lead to an inability to critique undemocratic and 
non-liberal discourses within the movement. One example from the 
Water Movement is the popular curse of death against policemen’s 
family members. Clearly, it is not compatible with a rule of law 
society to punish the family members of even the worst criminals. 
Some protestors are loyal Trump supporters, for the enemy of their 
enemy must be their friend (Kipnis 2020), and are willing to overlook 
his lies, racism, sexism, and assault on democracy. Not all protestors 
agree with these expressions. These ideological differences lurk behind 
a seemingly solidified identity of a Hong Konger. Even without new 
legal restrictions, these internal tensions plague the prospect of the 
next social movement in Hong Kong.
Through the lens of the protest anthem, this paper has illustrated 
the past and present state of social movements in Hong Kong. Social 
movements in Hong Kong flourished during the late colonial period 
and the first 23 years after the handover. Compared with earlier times 
(Chen 2017), law has become less a resource for social movements in 
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Hong Kong but more a restraint. Based on Tilly and Wood (2009)’s 
model, social movements are likely to recede with de-democratization. 
What complicates the picture is that Hong Kong has not only been 
subjected to dramatic changes in local law, but has been caught in the 
middle of the rapid legal crossfires between global powers. The future 
is unknown, and probably cannot be gauged from China’s internal 
politics alone.
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Endnotes
1. The future enactment of this law is prescribed in Article 23 of the Basic 
Law in Hong Kong.
2. Even though the protest ended with the government making the 
curriculum optional instead of mandatory, many schools have now 
incorporated national education into their curriculum.
3. The Umbrella Movement is widely seen as a defeat despite the fact that 
the electoral reform was ultimately rejected by the Legislative Council.
4. The arrangements for the surrender of fugitive offenders applicable in the 
Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503) (‘FOO’) are not applicable to 
‘other parts of the PRC’. Under this law, Taiwan is considered as part 
of China.
5. The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 would introduce into the FOO a new 
rendition arrangement between HK and other parts of China (including 
Mainland China, Taiwan and Macau).
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6. Localist groups on a wide political spectrum have emerged. Progressive 
localists are interested in protecting local heritage and pursuing social 
equity. Right-wing localists are populist and xenophobic. See Kaeding 
(2017), and Chen and Szeto (2015). 
7. A peaceful demonstration involving a human chain formed with 
approximately two million people across three Baltic states, which aimed 
to express their popular desire for independence from Soviet rule.
8. One source of quantitative data for the evolving sense of identity in Hong 
Kong comes from a longitudinal survey conducted by the Public Opinion 
Programme at the University of Hong Kong. Survey data collected over 
the years show a steady increase of participants self-identifying as Hong 
Kongers (peaking at 52.9 per cent in 2019), and a record lowest percentage 
of participants identifying as Chinese (at 10.8 per cent) in 2019. See See 
HKUPOP data published at <https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/
popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html>
9. In 2010, the Education Bureau circulated guidelines for flag display at 
schools (Education Bureau 2010). By 2015/2016, 72 per cent of primary 
schools and 37 per cent of secondary schools in Hong Kong were using 
Putonghua to teach Chinese (The Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region 2018).
10. The Chinese anthem March of the Volunteers was written in the 1930s about 
volunteer armies that fought against the Japanese during the invasion of 
Manchuria. The song is a march, adopting a western form; the lyrics are 
in Mandarin. The lyricist Tian Han was imprisoned during the Cultural 
Revolution and died in prison.
11. This soundtrack comprises both older songs deemed fitting for the occasion, 
and songs written as a reaction to the tragedy such as For Freedom, No 
Need to Face Darkness Anymore, Freedom Flower.
12. The chorus roughly translates as “Forgive me for loving freedom all my 
life / Though I’m also afraid of falling one day / It is easy to give up one’s 
dreams / But I won’t fear even if there’s just you and me left.”
13. Typically, much Cantopop has been produced – and localised – in a similar 
fashion whereby Cantonese lyrics are transplanted into tunes borrowed 
from overseas sources.




15. Rühlig (2016) also observes that after the Occupy ended, a radical and 
xenophobic kind of localism emerged and may be captured in the cover 
song Gau Yu Everyday.
16. The ‘Primary Schools Profiles 2020’ contained the most recent data on 
religion in HSKAR schools at the time of writing (Committee on Home-
School Co-operation 2020). 
17. My translation prioritises the literal meaning of the original at the cost of 
its literary appeal. The original version of the song is viewable at https://
youtu.be/y7yRDOLCy4Y
18. Glory to Hong Kong ava i lable at <ht tps: //w w w.youtube.com/
watch?v=ulera9c18F0> 
19. Cantonese opera is much more popular with older than younger generations 
in Hong Kong; see analysis in Creery 2019b. A Cantonese opera version 
of Glory to Hong Kong is available at < https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FsRm5ujBm2o>; a sign language version is available at < https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MbUn5GqUKic> 
20. For example, Glory to Hong Kong was subsequently translated into English, 
Japanese, Korean, German, Italian, French and other languages; these 
multilingual versions of the song are available on YouTube at the time 
of writing. 
21. This etiquette is specified in the U.S. Flag Code, even though it is not 
legally enforced.  See Blackmore 2016.
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